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ABSTRACT
The present study of analogical transfer examined
patterns of positive and negative transfer, the relationship
between level of representation (specific or abstract
schema) and transfer, and the effects of abstract schema
training on problem solving In 6-year-olds. A total of 116
first grade subjects were assigned to five conditions:
Schema Training Positive, Schema Training Negative, Story
Analogue Positive, Story Analogue Negative. and Control.
Six-year-olds are able to spontaneously transfer analogous
solutions when base and target problems share few surface
similarities. An abstract representation of the source
analogue Is an important determinant of transfer; however,
specific representations do not seem sufficient for
transfer. Negative transfer was obtained when the transfer
task Involved a solution principle different from the base
problems. Schema training could effectively Improve positive
transfer; however, such training did not improve the ability
to discriminate the effectiveness of a solution In the
negative training condition. Developmental and educational
Implications are discussed, and future studies on children's
analogical transfer are outlined.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The present study examines whether first-grade children
are able to spontaneously transfer an analogical solution
when few surface features are shared between base and target
problems. This study also examines how level of
representation Influences analogical transfer. Based on the
findings of prior research It was predicted that an abstract
representation would be more effective In transfer than a
domain-specific representation. if so, Instructions
encouraging and guiding children to construct an abstract
schema might also Increase the likelihood of analogical
transfer, and so the effects of training are also of
interest here. Finally, the Issue of children's negative
transfer Is addressed. The Impact of a solution principle
that Is not appropriate for solving the transfer problem Is
studied, along with the effects of training this principle,
and the consequences for discriminating applicability to the
transfer situation. Is problem solving Impaired when base
and target problems require different solution principles?
1
Traditional Transfer Theories
Modern research and theories on learning transfer have
their historical roots In the works of Thorndike and
Woodworth in 1901 and 1903 and Judd In 1908. Thorndike and
Woodworth proposed that transfer from one task to another
occurs only when the two tasks share a set of common
stimulus features or elements. For example, Thorndlke's
theory of identical elements stated that for transfer to
occur, there must be some elements of identity or similarity
between the Influencing and Influenced "mental functions".
When two tasks shared similar elements or features, a
response learned to one task could facilitate or inhibit the
second task. However, this I dent I ca I -e i ements theory came
under attack as a result of studies by Judd (1908) and his
colleagues. Judd argued that the important condition for
transfer was that the subject be able to abstract general
rules or principles. He called this a theory of
generalization, by which he meant that a subject must be
able to "general Ize" his or her experiences from one
situation to another In order for transfer to take place.
These early theories of transfer represent historical
viewpoints which guided much of early research on this
topic. Actually, identical elements and generalization are
not mutually exclusive theories, nor are they diametrically
opposed. Rather, they may be regarded as different ways of
2
trying to explain the processes contributing to transfer.
Thorndlke's theory focused attention on the elements In
common between learning material or activities in which
transfer was expected to occur, while Judd emphasized the
learner's competence In generalizing from one situation to
another, it was the similar elements theory, however, which
dominated the early research literature concerned with
transfer
.
The findings of early studies comparing the effects of
the similarity of stimuli and responses were summarized
several decades ago by Osgood (1949). He presented a
theoretical integration of available empirical data In the
form of a figure which became known as a transfer
surface, and which claimed to show the relationship between
response and stimulus similarity in two tasks and the
transfer effects that could be expected. The Osgood model
showed that if two tasks shared similar stimuli and required
the same responses, what was learned about the stimuli In
one task would generalize to the similar stimuli provided in
the second task. Thus, what was learned from one task was to
some degree transferred to performance on the second task.
This described the operation of stimulus generalization. On
the other hand. If two tasks called for different responses
to similar stimuli, the response learned to the first task
3
would Interfere with the response to be learned on the
second task. The consequence would be negative transfer.
Background Research And Theoretical Issues
The Influence of Thorndlke's and, subsequently, Osgood's
views concerning transfer can be seen In a great number of
early studies which focused on the conditions that Influence
transfer (e.g., WIttrock, 1963; Martin, 1965; Anderson,
1956). Nearly all were concerned with stimulus and response
relationships that enhance or decrease transfer performance.
However, a few of these studies also attempted to evaluate
mechanisms of transfer and their development, or gave
consideration to the cognitive processes Involved In the
more creative and productive sense In which transfer Is
known to occur In problem solving. Recently, however,
several programs of research have been Initiated
Investigating the mechanisms of transfer In realistic
problem solving situations with a particular focus on the
Important roles of rules, principles, and cognitive
processes. One specific type of problem, that of analogical
transfer, and the factors that seem to Influence performance
on this type of task, are especially relevant to the
research conducted In this study.
Studies on Analogical Transfer
In recent years, analogy has come to be viewed as a
major heuristic for solving problems. Analogy requires that
4
the problem solver use the solution concerning a problem In
one domain to solve a problem In another domain. GIck and
Holyoak (1983) argued that there are two essential elements
for studying analogical transfer In problem solving. First.
Information which Is analogous to the target problem must be
provided. That Is, a subject must understand the solution to
a prior problem or comprehend the story before receiving the
target problem. Second, the transfer problem must be new and
sufficiently difficult so that the analogy can be
potentially effective In arriving at a solution.
Several recent studies have been carried out to
Investigate the processes by which adults solve analogical
problems. Reed, Ernst and Baner J I ( 1974) used the
missionary-cannibal and Jealous husbands problems to
Investigate the effect of transfer between two tasks having
similar (Isomorphic) problem states. This type of problem Is
viewed as a "we I I -def I ned " problem (see Minsky, 1961;
Reltmen, 1964; Simon. 1973) since the Initial conditions,
acceptable procedures and goal to be reached are explicitly
specified. These two problems are similar because both
Involve a river crossing. In both problems, subjects need to
transport three missionaries and three cannibals (or
husbands and wives) across a river on a ferry which Is so
small that It can contain no more than two persons.
Moreover, the missionaries on either bank or In the boat
must not be outnumbered at any time and similarly, no wives
shall be left In the company of any men. unless her husband
Is present. in both cases, subjects are required to move
people and evaluate the legality of their moves. Someone who
knows the solution to the missionaries problem can solve
the Jealous husbands problem by substituting husbands for
missionaries and wives for cannibals. In addition, In the
Jealous husbands problem, subjects must pair men and women
who are on the same bank of the river. If people make use of
the analogy. It should be easier to solve the second of
these two problems If they have already solved the first.
However, the results Indicated that people were. In fact,
not better at solving the target problem after they first
solved the other problem than subjects with no prior
experience with the analogous problem.
One explanation for why people did not improve their
performance on the second of these two similar problems is
that they did not perceive the relationship between the two
problems. In a second study, the experimenter encouraged
subjects to use the solution for the first problem to solve
the second problem. They Informed subjects that husbands
corresponded to missionaries and wives corresponded to
cannibals. The information Indicating that the problems were
related did help subjects solve the missionaries and
cannibals problem when It was the target problem but It did
not help them to solve the Jealous husbands problem when it
was the target problem.
The results of this study Indicated that the successful
use of analogy by adults does not occur as read I
l y as
researchers might expect. The fact that subjects needed to
be Informed about the correspondences between the two
stories Indicated that subjects had difficulty In "noticing"
that there is some relationship between one problem and
another. But even when the instructions emphasized the exact
relationship between the two problems, arriving at the
solution for one problem did not guarantee solution of the
other. One explanation for this latter finding Is that It is
difficult to remember the correct solution (exact steps)
when It consists of a long sequence of moves. This
hypothesis suggests that the use of analogy should be more
effective when the solution is easier to remember.
Several other Investigations of analogical transfer have
adopted relatively " 1 I I -def I ned " types of problem to study
transfer between base and target problem. Such Mi-defined
problems often require only one creative or Insightful step
and allow multiple solutions. An example of such a problem
Is the tumor or radiation problem which was first used by
Duncker (1945). In this problem, a doctor needs to use a
kind of ray to destroy a malignant tumor In a patient's
stomach. However, If the ray Is of sufficiently high
7
Intensity to destroy the tumor, the healthy tissue that the
ray passes through will also be destroyed. An acceptable
solution Involves dividing the ray Into many less Intense
rays so they will have a high Intensity only when they
converge on the tumor (dispersion solution). Although this
Is an effective solution, Duncker found that very few people
solved the problem In this way.
GIck and Ho I yoak (1980) investigated whether more people
would discover the dispersion solution If they were first
exposed to an analogous story. Their subjects (college
students) read an attack-dispersion story associated with a
military problem in which the army had to be divided in
order to converge on and capture a fortress. The
Instructions Indicated that this story might prove
Insightful for solving the radiation problem. The results
showed that most people did make use of the analogue. Over
half of those who read the attack-dispersion story included
a radiation dispersion solution among their proposed
solutions compared to only 8% of the people who did not read
the base story before attempting to solve the radiation
story. But when GIck and Holyoak omitted the hints to use
the military story, many subjects again failed to notice the
relevance of It for the medical story, and hence the
frequency of use of the dispersion solution to destroy the
tumor decreased. Their findings provided further
8
confirmation that college students can generate an analogous
solution when prompted, but they often fall to spontaneously
recognize or notice It.
Several experiments, then, have shown that people often
fall to notice the relation between two problems unless the
Instructions describe the relation, or at least suggest that
some relation exists (e.g.. Reed et al, 1974; Duncker , 1 926
;
GIck & Holyoak, 1980). Several factors, such as the
comp
I
ex I ty and type of prob I ems
,
degree of s Im I I ar I ty
between base and target problems, degree of or
i
g I na I -task
learning and variety of previous tasks could Influence
noticing and therefore analogical transfer. The possibility
is that these factors facilitate performance through
increasing cue or surface similarity, a factor that would
not extend our understanding of transfer processes much
beyond ear I I er concept Ions of Identical el ements . But
another answer to the problem of "noticing" has been given
In terms of the induction of a schema (GIck & Holyoak,
1983), a generalized representation of the Initial state,
solution plan and outcome of a problem. GIck and Holyoak
( 1 983 ) argued that when a schema I s abstracted , this
relationship can be effectively mapped from one problem to
another. Furthermore, analogous Information In the form of
an abstract schema might be more accessible than Information
I n concrete forms when subjects encounter the target
9
problem. Thus, an Important Issue for GIck and Ho I yoak has
been to determine how a problem Is represented since It Is
these representations that govern the likelihood of noticing
an analogy and mapping the correspondences between base and
target problems.
GIck and Holyoak (1983) attempted to encourage subjects
In several ways to abstract a general (convergence) schema
when exposed to only a single analogous story. These
Included (1) asking subjects to summarize the story rather
than recall details; (2) asking them to read a sentence at
the end of the story which abstractly described the solution
to the problem; and (3) providing subjects with a diagram to
represent the underlying solution principle after subjects
read the story. None of these attempts were successful.
In contrast, subsequent experiments by GIck and Holyoak
(1983) demonstrated that If two prior analogs were given,
subjects often developed a convergence schema and hence,
Improved transfer. Under these circumstances, subjects given
analogs with an additional abstract sentence summarizing the
solution principle or with a diagram depicting a figure
characterization of the solution principle, achieved even
higher levels of transfer than subjects In the analog only
condition. Furthermore, the quality of the Induced schema
was highly predictive of subsequent transfer performance.
Summaries by the subjects were categorized into three
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levels, good. Intermediate and poor, based on the degree to
which subjects produced the solution principle, that Is, "to
use many small forces together to add up to one large force
necessary to destroy the object" (p. 23). A much higher
percentage of subjects who produced good schemas achieved
transfer (91%) than those who produced Intermediate (40%) or
poor schemas (30%). This finding was obtained whether
analogs came from the same domain (both were military
stories) or from dissimilar domains (a military vs. a
f i re-f
I
ght I ng story).
The Investigations briefly reviewed here examined the
mechanisms of transfer or conditions which Influence
analogical transfer. Several other related studies (e.g.,
Welsberg et al 1978, Perfetto et ai 1983, Stein et al 1986)
have also Indicated that Individuals usually do not
spontaneously access useful prior Information while solving
"Insight" problems.
Developmental Research on Analogical Transfer
Whi le a great deal of work has been done on how
subjects solve formal analogies (see Sternberg & Rifi<in,
1979; Sternberg, 1982), relatively little has been done on
the use of analogy In solving realistic problems, especially
by children. Many studies of analogical thinking and Its
development have been carried out using the form A:B::C:?.
Such problems emphasize how the relationship between A and B
1
1
Is generalized so that an I tern Is selected to match C. The
fact that subjects are Informed that A and B have a
relationship and that It Is useful for deriving the answer,
precludes gaining information about developmental
differences In how children "notice" analogical
re I at I onsh
I ps
.
Holyoak, Junn and Blllman ( 1984) I nvest I gated young
children's ability to transfer a common solution heard In
one story to an analogous problem. Preschoolers and fifth
and sixth graders were asked to solve a problem that allowed
multiple solutions. The transfer problem required children
to move small balls from a nearby bowl to an empty bowl
farther away and beyond the children's reach. They could
solve the problem by using a hollow cardboard tube long
enough to reach the farther bowl or by rolling up a heavy
paper to form a tube or by using a cane to pull the distant
bow I nearer
.
Before attempting to solve the transfer problem,
subjects first read a story that Involved an analogous
problem. The mapping between the analogous and target
problems was fairly straightforward, In that the
corresponding Instruments were perceptually and functionally
similar. Even preschoolers were able to use this analogy to
derive a solution to the target problem. However, a high
degree of perceptual and functional similarity between the
12
Instruments In the base and target problem seemed neither
sufficient nor necessary for success by preschool subjects.
When the story analog mapped well onto the transfer problem.
4-year-olds were often able to transfer a solution, although
there was little perceptual or semantic similarity between
the base and target problems. In this study, children
demonstrated considerable ability at analogical problem
solving, although this ability was relatively fragile,
especially for younger children. For example, young children
typically required hints to consider the prior problem,
otherwise, they frequently failed to notice that the two
situations might be analogous. Younger children tended to
rely on the surface features shared by base and target
problems to "notice" the analogy.
Crisafi and Brown (1986) examined the ability of even
younger children (2-4 years old) to transfer responses in a
similar tasl<
.
They found that by 3-years of age, children
were able to perform analogical transfer. They also found
that analogical transfer can be facilitated either by
directly Informing children that the target problem is an
appropriate occasion for the application of the old
responses, or by encouraging children to talk about the rule
underlying the solution to two analogical base problems that
were presented. For example, after they completed the two
problems, the experimenter described the rule common to each
13
version. The subjects were able to repeat the rule after It
was stated by the experimenter although few of them could
state the rule In abstract terms without aid. Nevertheless,
when the rule was explicitly described by the experimenter
and repeated by subjects, there was a great Improvement In
subsequent transfer, compared to when subjects received no
such training.
Brown, Kane and Echols (1986) have performed additional
studies to assess how representation Influences young
children's analogical transfer. In their study Brown et al.
explored whether subjects are more likely to achieve
transfer when they spontaneously recall or are prompted to
form a common goal structure for the base and target
problems than when they fall or are not required to form
such a schema. The goal structure Includes a character (Who
has a problem?), goal (What did the character want to do?),
obstacle (What Is stopping him?), and a solution (How did he
do It?). When subjects were encouraged to concentrate on the
essential elements of the analogous story by being asl<ed
four questions about these elements, 93% of five-year-olds
and 63% of four-year-olds showed transfer. However, only 75%
and 56% of the respective age groups In the spontaneous
recall condition, and only 66% and 44% of subjects In the
control group showed transfer.
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In another study, subjects who spontaneously focused on
the goal structure In their recall (68% for 5-year-oids) or
who did not recall the goal structure but were prompted to
achieve such a structure ( 71% and 64% for 5- and
3-year-olds respectively), evidenced transfer. But only 14%
of the 6-year-olds who did not represent the problems at the
level of the underlying goal structure, and Instead reported
only Irrelevant surface features, showed transfer. The data
provide strong support for the claim that the common goal
structure allows for analogical transfer.
Brown et al's findings also indicated that children as
young as 3 year of age have the underlying competence to
flexibly transfer a common problem solution. Based on these
findings. Brown et al. went on to conclude that transfer is
not a simple function of age but depends on the level of
analysis afforded the base analogy. That is, level of
representation rather than age determines transfer
efficiency. However, It should be noted that since age and
representational efficiency might be highly positively
correlated, transfer ability could be age sensitive.
Major Issues Related to the Present Study
Level of Representation. The representation of an
analogy may occur at different levels of abstraction. Brown
et al's common goal structure seems to be relatively more
specific than GIck and Holyoak's abstract convergence
15
schema. A goal structure Is abstract In that It Includes
four major elements of a story problem: a goal, a
protagonist, an obstacle and a solution. Nevertheless, the
goal structure Is represented or manifested In relatively
concrete form since It Is still tied to the particular
character, goal, obstacle and solution of a story problem
(e.g., "the genie transfers Jewels from bottle 1 across wall
Into bottle 2 by using his magic carpet") rather than to a
more abstract schema or generalized principle. Brown
suggested that such a goal structure Is "an optimal mental
model" of the base analog and "the most advantageous level
of representation". However, a common goal structure and a
convergence schema can be viewed as two different levels of
representation In terms of abstraction. The former Is
relatively specific while the latter Is more abstract and
generalized than the former.
A knowledge structure that still retains featural
commonalities between domains can be expected to maximize
the likelihood of noticing the analogical relationship and
this should be beneficial to subsequent transfer. The
results In Brown at el's study suggested that subjects who
form a goal structure achieved a very high level of
transfer. However, the relative efficiency of a specific
representation vs. an abstract, doma I n- I ndependent schema
can only be directly addressed by comparing transfer
16
per formance between subjects who form a goa I structure
(specific representation only) with those who summarize a
doma I n- free pr I nc
I
p I e as we I I . Ch II dren who produce an
abstract schema would be more likely to achieve analogical
transfer than those who Just construct the spec I f I
c
representat Ion
.
Processes of Analogical Transfer, Almost all studies of
analogical transfer In problem solving have focused only on
"not I c I ng" and "mapp I ng" processes . Actua My. p rob I em
solving by analogy Is a complex cognitive activity. Several
researchers have described and analyzed these processes
(e.g., Holyoak, 1984; Gentner In press). Holyoak argued that
there are four components I nvo I ved In analogical transfer:
(1) forming a menta I representat I on of the base and target
prob I ems ; ( 2 ) not Icing the potent I a I I y ana I ogous
re I at I onsh I p between the prob I ems ; (3) mapp I ng the
cor r espondences between the el ements of the base and target
;
and (4) extending the mapping to construct a solution
appropr late for the target problem. Gentner descr I bed
sever a I subprecesses of ana I og I ca I I earn I ng . Accord I ng to
her view, learning by analogy Involves accessing the base
problems; mapping the base and the target; Judging the
soundness of the mapp I ng and extract I ng the genera I
principle. Thus, a theoretical analysis of how analogies are
used to solve problems has suggested that both analogous
17
problem and target problems must be represented,
similarities between the problems must be noticed, and the
representations of the problems must be mapped. Yet an
additional Important process Is concerned with evaluating
the appropriateness of using the solution, or In the case of
multiple potential sources for analogical transfer,
discriminating that which Is best or most appropriate.
In essence, success In using an analogy In problem
solving depends on representing, noticing, mapping and
applying. Recognizing the analogous relationship between the
base and target, or noticing the "problem Isomorph" (Newell,
1979; Rumelhart & Norman, 1981, and Simon, 1979) is an
essential prerequisite, while eventual application involves
transforming the relatively abstract or generalized
principle Into a concrete form in the target probiem
situation, and simultaneously, evaluating Its applicability
to the novel situation. When the solution principle Is
exactly the same, application seems trivial. However, when
the analogous solution requires elaboration In order to suit
the principle to the target problem situation, or the
solution rule Is Inappropriate to the target problem, or the
most effective solution principle must be discriminated from
multiple analogical situations, the process of applying is
crucial for appropriately solving the problem. Negative
18
transfer is espec
I
a I I y prob I emat I c In situations Involving
the application of an analogous solution.
Brown (Brown & Camplone. 1984; Brown et al, 1986) has
pointed out that effective transfer Involves discriminating
the appropriateness of a solution to a situation rather than
blind application. She implied that the process of
transferring Information across task boundaries should
Include a component of evaluation. Failure to transfer can
be a consequence of many factors. On the one hand.
Information available In one situation, though appropriate,
may not be readily used. The Inability to flexibly use
available Information for appropriate occasions may be
largely due to falling to notice the similarities among the
situations. On the other hand, knowledge may be applied In
Inappropriate contexts. Subjects may rely on similarity in
the surface features of task situations and fail to realize
such features may not be relevant or can be misleading.
Mistaken or Inefficient application Is the product of
failure to discriminate the functional differences between
the problem situations. Thus, flexible and appropriate
transfer of a known solution principle requires noticing and
also evaluating the applicability of the solution to a new
occas I on
.
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The "Set " Problem and Negative Transfer. When a person
repeats a mental activity, there Is some tendency for It to
persist In a new situation although In some cases the rule
or strategy Is no longer suitable to the situation. The
classic study of the "set" or "sequence cue" was reported by
Luchlns (1942) who studied the effect of giving subjects a
series of "water-Jar problems" In which subjects were shown
a set of Jars of various capacities and an unlimited water
supply. The subject's task was to measure out a specific
quantity of water. Of ten problems presented to subjects,
all but the eighth could be solved using the B-2C-A method,
that Is, by filling B, pouring B Into C twice, and then
pouring B into A. For the first 5 problems, this solution
was the only solution, but for problems 7 and 9, and problem
6 and 10, a simpler solution existed (A+C and A-C,
respectively). Problem 8 could be solved using only a
simpler solution (A-C). After doing problems 1 through 5,
83% of the subjects continued to use the B-2C-A method to
solve problem 6 and 7, 64% failed to solve problem 8, and
79% used B-2C-A for problems 9 and 10. The performance of
subjects who worked on all problems was compared with the
performance of control subjects who only saw the last five
problems. Fewer than 1% of the control subjects used the
B-2C-A solution on problems 6 through 10, and only 5% failed
20
to solve problem 8. Thus, the first five problems created a
powerful bias for a particular solution.
Problem-solving set has been described In negative
terms. Actually. whether a set will facilitate or Impair
solving problems depends on the applicability of the set to
the problem. Set effects occur when some Information or
certain rules become more available at the expense of
others. If the available knowledge Is what the subject needs
for solving the problem, his or her problem solving will be
facilitated. If the available knowledge Is not what Is
needed, problem solving will be Inhibited. A set usually
Involves a fairly specific solution rule which will aid In
solving some problems but Impair solving others.
Negative transfer Is related to the "set" problem. A
major Impediment to flexible learning Is often not the lack
of transfer across domains, but rather "Inappropriate
transfer" (Brown & Camplone. 1984), Including functional
fixedness and set. Since positive and negative transfer are
aspects of the same process, consideration of Issues of
application may tell us a great deal about the process of
analogical transfer. In several studies we described above,
once the analogy was noticed, the application of the rule
was fairly trivial. But In a few cases, the "analogous"
solution was not useful to the target problem, the "analog"
was a trap, and Inhibited other better solutions, as Luchlns
21
(1942) has shown so dramatically. Investigating both
positive and negative transfer In problem solving might shed
more light on the mechanisms of f lex Ible and appropr late
transfer and provide a better and more comprehensive
understanding of transfer In new contexts.
A large number of studies of learning have tested for
both positive and negative transfer, but few have been
carried out using analogical transfer. The heuristic value
of analogies is often the key to creative solutions to a
problem. However, people do not always take advantage of
this type of transfer. Not only do principles sometimes fail
to generalize, but they may transfer to situations where
they are inappropriate.
Brown and Kane (in press) examined young children's
negative transfer. They considered both functional fixedness
(where the typical function of a tool Is reinforced and Is
thereby rendered unavailable for a novel use) and cognitive
embeddedness (where a potential solution tool Is not seen
because It Is embedded In a familiar context) as Impediments
to cognitive flexibility and learning to learn. In a
pretralning task, children were engaged In using a certain
object (e.g., string) In typical ways (hanging, tieing,
pulling), or In atypical ways: measuring, sewing and
stuffing. Thus, the function of the string was a usual one
(functional fixedness condition) or an unusual one
22
(flexibility condition). Children showed less transfer In
the functional fixedness condition than In a baseline
condition. But. the flexibility condition yielded a great
Increase in transfer presumably because the unusual uses of
the string led to Its being freed from Its typical function
and made it more available as a problem solution tool.
A replication was also carried out in which biological
themes served as the domain for the analogy. m the
"flexible group", young children benefited from the multiple
examples of how animals defend themselves by various
mechanisms. Although the learning phase did not cause them
to learn a particular rule, It did prepare them to look for
novel solutions suitable to the new situation. In contrast,
children in "fixedness group" attempted to apply a
particular rule learned from several examples. The
particular rule blocked the subjects from considering
alternative possibilities.
When the base and target problems require the same
solution rule, a more abstract level of representation of
analogs should be beneficial to and yield positive transfer
across different domains (Gick & Holyoak, 1983), But will it
be harmful to problem solving when the two situations
require different solutions? Or can increasing abstraction
— from a more detailed or specific representation to a
schema — enhance both positive and negative transfer? Level
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of representation of analogs may only Influence noticing and
mapp I ng processes , and may not be I nstrumenta I I
n
facilitating evaluation or discrimination of the solution to
new situations.
Deve I opmenta
I D I f f erences
.
Severa I stud I es have
Indicated that transfer ability In problem solving Is
developmental iy sensitive. Young chl Idren's acquired
knowledge tends to be closely tied to specific situations,
and "flexible access to information" (Brown and Camplone,
1981) Is often assumed to be uncharacteristic of young
ch M dren ' s th i nk I ng ( Roz I n , 1 976 ; Brown & Camp I one , 1 984)
.
Under suitable circumstances, young children may well be
able to display a whole variety of logical competenc i es . For
ex amp I e , severa I stud 1 es have demonstrated that young
children are able to transfer prior know I edge to nove
I
contexts or domains to a certain extent. CrIsafI and Brown
(1986) found that 3-year olds transferred readily across
dissimilar problems If they first "taught" the base solution
to a puppet learner, and hence had been prompted to use the
common solution to the target problems. Holyoak et al's
findings (1984) demonstrated that even preschoolers can use
analogies to solve problems under optimal circumstances
(e.g., when hints are provided to encourage subjects to
find the similarity or when the similarity between task
contexts Is pointed out). Brown et al (1986) have obtained
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results which are also consistent with these findings.
However, young children's competence may be relatively
limited and more restricted In range than these studies
first suggest when we consider that flexible and appropriate
transfer Is affected not only by the ability to notice
problem Isomorphs, but also by an ability to discriminate
the appropriateness of prior Information In a novel
situation. Difficulty In transfer arises Just as readily
from Inappropriate application of rules as from a failure to
utilize available Information (Brown et ai, 1986). We can
not be certain from these prior experiments whether very
young children have effectively demonstrated transfer or are
blindly applying the solution principle that Immediately
dominates their thinking about a problem.
Current Investigations of transfer in problem solving
have focused on positive transfer, either with simple
analogical problem solving In young children (e.g., CrIsafI
& Brown, 1986; Ho I yoak et al, 1983; Brown et al, 1986) or
with more complex problems using adults (e.g.. Reed et al,
1974; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 1983). in these studies,
researchers have focused on the process of noticing and
mapping. That is, recognizing problem Isomorphs or
recognizing that a new situation is similar to one
encountered previously. In these cases, as Gick and Holyoak
have pointed out, the "gap" between initial noticing and
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eventual application of the analogs has been very small.
Once one recognizes the similarity, he or she can directly
apply the solution to the new situation without considering
the appropriateness. However, when the base and target do
not share a common solution rule, children might tend to
Inflexibly apply the rule If they recognize the similarities
of the surface features ("blind application"). Studies have
explored whether children have difficulty noticing a
potentially useful analogy, but few have explored children's
ability to decide whether an analogue is appropriate or not.
In summary, although relatively few studies have been
conducted examining the problem of analogical transfer,
particularly with children, a number of Investigations on
o
th I s top I c have shed some I I ght on the mechan i sms or
processes of transfer In problem solving. Data from adults
and children suggest that 1) Individuals do not usually
spontaneous ly use prior ana I ogous p rob I em so I ut I ons In
solving the Isomorphic problem, 2) analogies are often a
valuable heuristic for solving problems, even to young
children, although In many cases various hints are required;
3 ) Prior I n format I on might Impact negat I ve I y , rather than
positively, when base and target problems require different
solution rules, and 4) abstract schemas produce superior
analogical transfer for adults, and specific representations
(common goal structure) facilitate children's transfer. How
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d I f f erent
I
a I I eve I s of representat Ion of story ana logs
I nf I uence ch I I dren ' s pos 1 1 1 ve and negat i ve transfer
performances, and whether Instructions guiding children to
ach leve an abstract representat Ion Improve transfer
performance serve as the major question to be addressed In
the present Investigation.
The present study , then
,
attempts to focus on 1 ) the
patterns of children's positive and negative transfer In
p rob I em so I v I ng ; 2 ) the re I at I onsh I p between I eve I of
representation and positive and negative transfer, and 3)
the effects of schema training on positive and negative
analogical transfer. The transfer task emp I oyed In the
present study Involves two anal ogous story prob I ems which
share a common so I ut I on pr I nc I p I e at a deep I eve I but few
surface similarities with a practical target prob I em. Thus,
base and target problems share neither superficial features
nor context cues . In this case , effects of "set " or
"sequence prompts" Is minimized, and remember I ng the base
story problems might not be sufficient for transfer; an
abstract representation might be required.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
A total of 116 first grade subjects from one elementary
school In each of two cities, PIttsfleld (62) and Chlcopee
(54), Massachusetts were Included In this study. There were
57 males and 69 females (mean age= 6 years, 9 months).
Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls were Included
In each group and condition.
Mater 1 a I
s
Transfer Problem
The transfer problem used In this study requ I red
subjects to retrieve a bead from the bottom of a tall
cy I I nder . There were two versions of the problem:
1 . The "Add I ng" P rob I em
.
Sub Jects In this version of
the problem were provided with a glass cylinder 12 Inches
tall containing a small amount of water with a bead floating
on the surface. The cylinder was only 2 Inches In diameter
and subjects could not simply reach In to obtain the bead.
The cylinder was located on a child-size table along with a
number of other common I tems . These I nc I uded ( 1 ) a g I ass
measuring cup containing water, (2) two sticks of different
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colors ( t I nkertoys)
,
and (3) Irrelevant props. Irrelevant
props consisted of a piece of heavy paper, paper clips,
small toy bricks, a toy scissors, a toy hammer, pliers,
rubber bands and a scarf. The task was to retrieve the bead
without turning the cylinder upside down. In this version of
the problem, each stick was too short to reach the bead by
Itself. Moreover, If the two sticks were Joined, It was
still not possible to get the bead out. However, there was a
sufficient amount of water In the measuring cup so that when
poured Into the cylinder, the water level rose and the
floating ball could be reached.
2. The "Combining" Problem. This version of the problem
was exactly the same as the first except that 1) only a
sma I I amount of water was present In the measuring cup and
when poured Into the cylinder failed to raise the water
level sufficiently for the child to reach the bead, and (2)
a toy spoon with a tinkertoy connector on the handle
replaced one of the two sticks, and when attached to the end
of the other stick, could be used to lift the bead out of
the cy I i nder
.
Story Analogs
Two different sets of two stories were used as story
analogs for the experimental groups. Each of these four
stories Included a goal, obstacle, solution and irrelevant
information (extra details).
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Set 1. Both of the stories used In this set Included a
problem In which the solution was similar to version 1 of
the transfer problem described above. The two stories
described different situations and protagonists, but the
solution rule was the same, that is, "reaching an object
that can not be directly retrieved by adding something to
make It rise". The first story described a bird trying to
drink water from a bottle but she could not reach the water.
The solution was to use her beak to pick up and put some
pebbles Into the bottle so that the water level was
elevated. In the second story, a ping pong ball rolled Into
a narrow hole. The hole was too deep for the boy to reach
the ball. The solution was to fill the hole with water so
that the ping pong ball floated to the top. The complete
stories are presented In Appendix A.
Set 2. The two stories used as base analogs In this set
utilized solutions appropriate for Version 2 of the transfer
problem. The first story described a monkey who was able to
combine two short poles together so that it was now long
enough to reach the food outside its cage. The second story
described a boy who was able to get a ba I i from the roof by
tieing two bats together so that the bail could be reached.
See Appendix A for these stories.
Table 1 summarizes the goal, obstacle, and relevant
solution principles for the transfer problems and outlines
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Table 1
SUMMARY OF TRANSFER PROBLEM AND BASE STORIES
Transfer Prob I em
GOAL: To get the bead out of the cylinder
OBSTACLE: The bead is too low to reach
RELEVANT SOLUTION: Version 1. Add Water
Vers I on 2 . Comb I ne I terns
Base Stor I es
SET 1
Spec I f I c Repr esentat Ion —
"The Th I rsty B I rd" "The Fa! I en Ba I I
"
Goa I : Get a drink of water Get pingpong ball In hole
Obstacle: Water too low to reach Ball too deep to reach
Solution: Put stones Into bottle Pour water Into hole
Abstract Schema — Reach i ng someth I ng that can not be
directly obtained by adding something
to make it rise.
SET 2:
Spec I f I c Repr esentat ion —
"The Hungry Monkey" "The Caught Ba 1 1
"
Goa I : Get food outside the cage Get ball from the roof
Obstacle: Food too far away to reach Ball too high to reach
Solution: Join two sticks together Join two bats together
Abstract Schema — Reaching something that can not be
directly obtained by combining two Items
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the specific representations and the abstract schema or more
genera I I zed representat Ion that captures the essent i a I
solution principle for the sets of stories.
An additional set of two neutral stories was used In a
control condition. These stories, also presented In Appendix
A» were about a visit to the zoo and moving Into a new
house. Irrelevant to the target problem.
Pes I gn and Procedure
There were ten groups In this study : four Story
Analogue groups, four Schema Training groups and two Control
groups, are summarized In Table 2. These groups differed in
wh I ch vers I on of the transfer p rob I em they rece I ved
( "add I ng " or "comb Ining" solution principle), which base
stor les they were presented (Set 1 or Set 2 or Control ) and
whether the solution principle I nt reduced In the base
stor 1 es agreed with or differ ed from the solution principle
for the target problem ( pos i 1 1 ve or negat Ive transfer). The
experimental procedure consisted of two phases. First, two
base stories were provided. Second, the transfer problem was
presented
.
Presentation of Base Stories
Story Analogue Groups. In these groups, the subject was
I nstructed that he/she wou I d hear two stor I es . After
listening to each story the subject was asked to recall It.
After both stories were read and recalled, the subject was
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Table 2
SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS
Base Transfer Type of
Cond 1 1 1 on Prob 1 em So 1 ut 1 on Transfer
Story-Ana 1 ogue Set 1 Add Water Pos 1 t 1 ve
Schema-Tra 1 n 1 ng Set 1 Add Water Pos 1 t 1 ve
Story-Ana 1 ogue Set 2 Add Water Negat 1 ve
Schema-Tra 1 n 1 ng Set 2 Add Water Negat i ve
Cont ro
1
1 r re 1 evant Add Water n/a
Story-Ana 1 ogue Set 1 Comb 1 ne 1 tems Negat 1 ve
Schema-Tra i n 1 ng Set 1 Comb 1 ne 1 tems Negat 1 ve
Story-Ana 1 ogue Set 2 Comb 1 ne 1 tems Pos 1 1 i ve
Schema-Tra i n 1 ng Set 2 Comb 1 ne 1 tems Pos i 1 1 ve
Cont ro
1
1 rre 1 evant Comb 1 ne 1 tems n/a
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also asked to Indicate the ways In which the two stories
were similar (e.g.. "Are these two stories alike?"; "Can you
tell me how they are alike?" "Was there anything that
happened In the two stories that was alike?"). The answers to
these questions and the recall protocols were subsequently
scored to determine whether the child had abstracted and
generalized the solution principle common to both problems.
Responses were classified as following Into one of four
levels of comprehension of the stories:
Level I : Irrelevant Reca I I — Irrelevant surface detal Is
of the stories were remembered.
Leve I II: I ncomp I ete Rep resent at I ona I Reca II — On I y the
solutions, but no other key elements (goal and
obstacle) of the probi ems were remembered , and
these were recalled In the form of story-
specific features of the problems.
Leve I III: Comp I ete Spec I f I c Representat I ona I Reca i i —
Al I three key aspects of the goal structure
for each story were remembered but In the form
of Stcry-spec I f i c features
.
Level iV: Abstract Representational Recall — A schema
Integ rating the key el ements and solution
principle for both stories was reported.
Examples of recall and response protocols scored at each
of the four representation levels are presented In Appendix
Schema Training Groups. Because not many subjects In
the Story Analogue Groups were expected to be able to
spontaneous I y generate abstract schemas when compar I ng the
two stories, four schema training groups were also Included
In this study. The story recall phase for these groups was
Identical to that In the Story Analogue Condition. After the
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stories had been presented, the subject was also Instructed
to compare the two stories. If he/she failed to provide an
abstract representation (Level IV), he/she was then
explicitly instructed concerning the generalized principle.
The following concrete questions were asked depending on the
response produced. "in both of the two stories, (the
characters) had a problem and tried to solve the problem.
How are the problems alike?" "They could not get the objects
(e.g., water and ping-pong ball), why?" "How did they
finally get the objects they wanted?" "How were the ways of
solving their problems alike?" After the subject answered
these questions, he/she was asked a general question: "Now,
can you tell me how the two stories are alike?". After the
subject summarized the stories, or was provided an explicit
verbal statement of the generalized schema If he/she failed
to do so, the problem solving phase was Introduced.
The two sets of stories were combined with the two
versions of the problem to balance conditions for positive
and negative transfer. Subjects who solve the "adding"
problem after hearing story Set 1 (or solved the "combining"
problem after receiving story Set 2) were expected to
demonstrate positive transfer. In contrast, negative
transfer might be expected when subjects solved the "adding"
problem after receiving the second set or solved the
"combining" problem after hearing the first set.
35
Control Groups. Subjects In the two Control Groups were
asked to so I ve the transfer prob I em after hear I ng two
neutral stories. The two control groups differed only with
respect to wh I ch vers Ion of the transfer prob I em they
rece I ved
.
Introduction of Transfer Prob I em
During the problem-solving phase, the table and the
apparatus were moved to the front of the child. The subject
was then shown a tall cylinder containing a little water
with a bead floating on the surface. The props which could
be used to solve the transfer problem as well as the several
I r re I evant I tems were scattered around the cy M nder . The
experimenter directed the child's attention to the cylinder
and I nst ructed : "Now , Let ' s do someth I ng e I se . Someone
dropped this bead In here. Can you get It out without
turning the cylinder upside down?" Subjects were encouraged
to think about the problem and to use the objects on the
table freely. If a sub Ject had not begun to attempt a
solution after 20 seconds, he/she was told: "Now, use
anything you want on the table to show me how to get the
ball out." Up to 200 seconds was allowed to solve the
prob I em
.
If the child produced an analogous solution, the
experimenter asked the child how he (she) arrived at It
("How did you think of pouring the water - or attaching the
36
spoon and st i ck?
" ;
"D I d you f i nd the stories helpful In
solving the problem?"; "How did the stories help you?")
Pred let Ions
Four major sets of predictions can be outlined:
1)
.
in the Story Analogue Conditions, the frequency of
using analogous solutions In the positive transfer groups
should be higher than the base rate produced by the control
groups. Time taken to solve the target problem might also
differ between subjects In the Story Analogue and Control
Cond I t I ons
.
2) . Subjects In the Story Analogue Positive Transfer
groups who are able to create abstract schemas (Level IV)
should solve the transfer problem more effectively than
those who form Irrelevant or specific representations. In
other words, transfer performance should be positively
correlated with the level of schema abstraction that
subjects demonstrate.
3) . The predictions for the Story Analogue groups
receiving a negative transfer task are more complicated.
Subjects could try to solve the target problem by using the
"faulty" analog provided In the stories. If so, few would
solve the problem successfully and such a finding would
suggest that subjects notice or access a solution principle
but fail to discriminate Its appropriateness for the
transfer problem. This blind application should also hinder
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subjects from arriving at potentially better solutions. On
the other hand, use of appropriate and faulty attempts to
solve the transfer problem may not differ from baseline
per formance In the Cont ro I Cond 1 1 1 on for two poss I b I
e
reasons. First, subjects may not perceive the relationship
between the negative base story analog and the target
problem so that no Interference occurs. Alternatively,
children may notice the negative solution principle but also
recognize that It is Inappropriate, and be able to reject it
so that another solution Is sought, much as in the Control
Groups
.
4). Finally, It is predicted that a greater percentage
of subjects In the Schema Training Pos Itlve Transfer groups
wl I I achieve an abstract schema and hence produce superior
transfer performance than subjects In the Story Analogue
Positive Transfer Condition who have not been trained to
represent the solution principle at an abstract level.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The present study addresses the following questions: (1)
Do first grade children spontaneously utilize the story
analogue to solve the target problem? (2) What role does
representation level of the base problems play In analogical
transfer? (3) Can children be effectively encouraged and
guided to achieve an abstract representation of prior story
problems In order to Improve transfer performance? and (4)
Does an acquired Inappropriate solution principle interfere
with solving a problem?
Five dependent measures were analyzed to address the
questions. First, the proportions of subjects In each
condition that were successful In solving the target problem
within 200 seconds were calculated. The proportions of
subjects who produced "appropriate" attempts to solve the
target problem were also calculated. Appropriate attempts
refer to those structurally similar to the correct solution
principle for the transfer problem, regardless of whether
they yielded success. For example, attaching Items (I.e.
stick and spoon; clothes pin and stick; hammer and clothes
pin) in the "combining" problem, or pouring water or
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dropping other I terns Into the water In the "adding" problem,
were considered appropriate attempts whether or not such
attempts led to successful problem solving.
Another measure was the proportion of subjects who
produced "faulty" attempts to solve the problem. Faulty
attempts refer to those structurally similar to the
Incorrect solution principle. For example. using water or
dropping other Items Into the water In the "combining"
problem or combining Items In the "adding" problem were
scored as faulty attempts. Faulty attempts do not Include
picking up and using the Irrelevant Items on the table. In
the negative condition, children could be misguided by the
Inappropriate solution principle, and the proportion of
subjects who Incorrectly attempt to solve the target problem
would Increase.
In addition to these dependent measures, a 6-polnt scale
was established to assess the relative efficiency and
success with which subjects approached and solved the
transfer task. This scale took Into consideration whether or
not subjects successfully solved the problem, If and when
they made appropriate or faulty attempts to solve the
problem, whether any Irrelevant solution attempts were
produced. The criteria for each scale assignment was as
fo I I ow :
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Solution Behaviors: Assigned Score:
No solution; No Appropriate attempt. 1
No solution; Appropriate attempt; Faulty attempt. 2
No solution; Appropriate attempt; No faulty attempt. 3
Solution; Appropriate attempt after faulty attempt. 4
Solution; Appropriate attempt; No faulty attempt. 5
Immediate solution without any Irrelevant activity. 6
The final dependent measure was time required by the
subjects to solve the problem. Response time has been shown
to be an Important Index of many types of cognitive
process Ing. For this analysis, problem solving time for
subjects who did not solve the target problem was scored as
200 seconds
.
Prel Imlnary Analyses
Preliminary analyses performed on the proportion of
subjects successful In solving the target problem and In
time taken to solve the problem yielded no reliable
difference between subjects from the two schools and between
boys and girls In any of the five conditions. Therefore, the
data were collapsed over school and gender.
The data have also been summarized over target problem
versions. The two versions of the target problem ("adding"
and "combining") were assumed to be the same level of
d I f f leu I ty and , I ndeed. the proper t Ions of subjects
successful In solving these two versions In the Control
Cond 1 1 1 on was approx I mate I y the same (33% and 25%,
respectively). There was also no significant difference In
the proportion of subjects successful In solving these two
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versions In either the Story Analogue or Schema Training
Cond 1 1 1 on
.
The scores for each of the five dependent measures for
each of the conditions are presented In Table 3. Differences
among these conditions were reliable for proportion of
subjects successful In solving the problem {x\a)~49.9,
£<.0001); proportion of subjects making appropriate attempts
2(X(4)-24.2, £<.0001); and proportion of subjects attempting
faulty solutions ( X*( 4 ) =25 . 98
, £<.0001). A One-way-ana I yses
of variance showed a highly significant difference In
subjects' scores on the success-efficiency scale
(F(4, 1 1 1 )=20.29, £<.0001) and In time taken to solve the
problem ( F ( 4 , l 1 1 ) - 1 7 . 63 , £<.0001). Further analyses were
carried out to examine specific Issues of concern In this
study, and are presented In the following sections.
The Pattern of Positive and Negative Transfer
As Table 3 reveals, seven of the 24 children in the
Control Condition solved the target problem, compared to 15
of 25 In the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer Condition, and
only two of 24 In the Story Analogue-Negative Transfer
Condition. The difference between the positive transfer and
control conditions was reliable at the .05 level
(X*( 1 )-3 . 71 ) . The proportion of subjects successfully solving
the problem In the Story Analogue-Negative Transfer
42
Table 3
SCORES ON VARIOUS DEPENDENT MEASURES
AS A FUNCTION OF CONDITION
Dependent
Measure
Schema
Tra I n I ng
Pos I t I ve
Transfer
(N=21
)
Story
Ana I ogue
Pos I t I ve
Transfer
(N=25)
Contro
I
(N=24)
Story
Ana I ogue
Negat I ve
Transfer
(N=24)
Schema
Tra i n i ng
Negat I ve
Transfer
(N=22)
Percentage
of Subjects
Successf u I I
y
Solving the
Prob I em
91%
( 19)
60%
(15)
29% 8% 5%
(7) (2) (1)
Percentage
of Subjects
Attempt 1 ng
Appr opr I ate
So I ut I ons
91%
(19)
68%
(17)
50% 25% 36%
(12) (6) (8)
Percentage
of Subjects
Attempt I ng
Fau 1 ty
So I ut I ons
0%
(0)
16%
(4)
17% 58% 46%
(4) (14) (10)
Mean Success
-ef f I c I ency
Score
5.09 3.80 2 .60 1 .50 1 .59
Mean Time
( seconds
)
to Solve
Prob I em
86 1 18 169 195 195
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Condition was lower than that In the Control Condition, and
the difference was marginally significant (X(1)=3.42, p< . 1 )
.
The pattern of findings was similar for the proportion
of subjects Initiating appropriate attempts although these
differences were not statistically significant. As presented
In Table 3, the proportion of subjects Initiating faulty
attempts was very high in the Story Analogue-Negative
Transfer Condition (58%). A reliably lower proportion of
subjects produced faulty attempts in the Control group (17%,
X(l)«:8.9, £<.01), and In the Story Analogue-Positive
Transfer Condition (16%).
Reliable differences were also found among all three
conditions on the success-efficiency scale. The mean score
for subjects In the Control group was 2.5, compared to 3.8
In the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer, and 1.5 in the
Story Analogue-Negative Transfer Condition, t^'s=2.25, 2.35,
£'s<.05. Mean time to solve the target problem was also
found to be reliably different between Control and Story
Analogue-Positive Transfer (169 vs. 118 sees., t(42)=-2.6,
p<.05), and between Control and Story Analogue-Negative
Transfer Condition (169 vs. 195 sees., t(29)--2.26, p<.05).
A two-way analysis of variance evaluating transfer type
(Positive vs. Negative) and training type (Story Analogue
vs. Schema Training) was also performed on the success-
efficiency score. As expected, this analysis showed a
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significant main effect for transfer type, F ( 1 , 88 ) -79 . 6
,
£<.0001. Further discussion of the results of this analysis
will be presented later.
Taken together. It Is obvious that transfer performance
by subjects In the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer
Condition was substantially higher than transfer performance
of subjects In the Control Condition. The reliable
differences Indicate that children are able to access the
prior analogous problems and utilize the solution principle
without any specific hints to do so. In contrast, subjects
In the Story Analogue-Negative Transfer Condition produced
significantly fewer appropriate solutions to the target
problem, and were misled by the prior story problems. These
results Indicate that solutions from prior story problems
are used by children and can lead to either better or poorer
performance depending upon the appropriateness of the
solution principle to which they are exposed. There Is
little evidence that children were able to discriminate the
effectiveness of the solution principles offered in the base
problems. The proportion of subjects attempting appropriate
solution In the positive transfer condition (68%) was very
close to the proportion of subjects attempting faulty
solution In the negative condition (68%). Similarly, the
proportion of subjects attempting appropriate solutions In
the negative transfer condition (25%) did not differ very
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much from the proportion of subjects attempting faulty
solutions In the positive transfer condition (16%). The
mlrror-IIke pattern reflected In these data suggests that
subjects In the negative transfer condition had difficulty
Ignoring the solution principle in the base problems that
they received, and tried to apply this faulty solution
principle nearly as readily as the subjects in the positive
condition tried to apply the appropriate solution. If
subjects were able to reject the inappropriate rule before
applying it, performance on problem solving would not be
reliably lower than In the Control Condition.
It had been expected that subjects who did not receive
the source analogs would solve the problem In essentially a
t r 1 a 1 -and-er ror manner, and that problem solving for
children who Initially received positive analogous problem
solutions would tend to be insightful. The time to retrieve,
translate and apply the analogous Information should be less
than the time to carry out the same activity without using
Information from the previous solutions (see Reed, 1985).
Thus, time taken to solve the problem and the number of
Irrelevant Items used before successfully solving the
problem should be substantially less In the analogue
condition. The mean time to solve the problem for
successful subjects In the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer
Condition (N=15) was 64 seconds. However, the mean time for
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successful subjects In the Control Condition (N-7) was 92
seconds. This difference was not significant (p>.i).
Moreover, the mean number of Irrelevant Items picked up by
these successful subjects before correctly solving the
problem (3.7 vs. 5.3 for Story Analogue-Positive Transfer
and Control conditions, respectively) did not differ
s I gn I f I cant I y
.
Effects of Representation Level on Analogical Transfer
A 4-polnt scale based on subjects' recall and
understanding of the two analogous story problems was
created to examine the effects of representation level on
analogical transfer. Subjects who recalled only the
extraneous, Irrelevant Information of both stories were
scored as Level I. Children who remembered the specific
solutions (or at least one solution) were classified as
Level I I
.
Those who were able to recal I al I critical aspects
of each story problem were rated at Level III. Finally, the
criteria for Level IV was either successful summary and
comparison of the two sets of key elements, or construction
of an abstract schema or principle.
Subjects' recall and understanding of the two story
problems were rated Independently by the author and two
other scorers. The agreement between pairs of Judges varied
between 94% and 96%. Disagreements In range never exceeded
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Table 4
REPRESENTATION LEVEL AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PERFORMANCEON TRANSFER TASK FOR SUBJECTS IN
THE STORY ANALOGUE, POSITIVE CONDITION
Dependent
Measure
Level IV
Abstract
Schema
{N=9)
Leve I III:
Spec I f I
c
Representat I on
(N=6)
Leve I I I
Spec I f I
c
So I ut I on
(N=4)
Leve I I
:
I r re I evant
Deta 1 1
s
(N=6)
Percentage
of Subjects
Solving the
Prob I em
100%
(9)
50%
(3)
50%
(2)
17%
( 1 )
Percentage
of Subjects
Attempt i ng
Appropr i ate
So I ut I ons
100%
(9)
67%
(4)
50%
(2)
33%
(2)
Percentage
of Sub Jects
Attempt I ng
Fau I ty
So I ut I ons
0%
(0)
50%
(3)
25%
( 1 )
0%
(0)
Mean Success
E f f I c I ency
Score
5 . 56 3
. 50 3.25 1 .83
Mean Time 74 132 118 170
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Table 5
PERFORMANCE ON THE TRANSFER TASK AS A FUNCTIONOF ABSTRACT VS. OTHER LEVELS OF REPRESENTATIONSTORY ANALOGUE AND SCHEMA TRAINING POSITIVE CONDITION
Story Analogue Schema Training
Dependent
Measure
Level IV
(N=9)
Leve I I
II & III
(N=16)
Leve! IV
(N=4)
Leve I I
II & III
(N=17)
Percentage
of Subjects
So I V I ng the
Prob I em
100%
(9)
38%
(6)
100%
(4)
88%
(15)
Percentage
of Subjects
Attempt I ng
Appropr late
So I ut I ons
100%
(9)
50%
(8)
100%
(4)
88%
(15)
Percentage
of Sub Jects
Attempt I ng
Fau I ty
So I ut I ons
0% 25%
(4)
0% 0%
Mean Success
E f f I c I ency
Score
5
. 56 2 . 80 5.75 4.94
Mean Time 74 143 29 99
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one level of the scale. Scores Involving disagreement were
resolved by consensus.
Since so few subjects In the Story Analogue-Negative
Transfer Condition solved the transfer problems. the
relationship between representation level and transfer
performance was not examined In this condition. The
performance on the problem solving task as a function of
representation level for subjects In the Story Analogue-
Positive Transfer Condition are presented In Table 4. All
twenty-five subjects In this condition were classified Into
one of the four levels. based on their memory and
understanding of the two story problems. For the subjects
who constructed an abstract schema (level IV), the
proportion successfully solving the problem was extremely
high: All nine children (100%) produced a correct solution.
In contrast, only 50% (three of six) children who formed a
specific representation (level III) achieved successful
solution, and 50% (two of four) In level II solved the
problem. Only 17% (one of six) of children In level I solved
the problem. Because of the small cell frequencies, a Fisher
Exact test was used rather than X. This test revealed that
subjects In level IV performed significantly better than
those In level III, II, and I (£<.05 for each comparison).
Obviously, there were no differences In performance between
subjects In levels III and II. Differences between levels II
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and I were not statistically analyzed because of the small
samp I es
.
A similar pattern was obtained for the proportion of
subjects Initiating appropr I ate attempts
. All subjects who
achieved Level IV produced appropriate attempts, compared to
only 67% of subjects who formed a specific representation
(Level I I I). The difference was marginally significant
(Xn )-3.46. £<. 1 ) .
None of the subjects In level IV produced any faulty
attempts, compared to three of six (60%) children In level
III (Fisher p<.06). Further analyses were carried out using
scores on the success-efficiency scale and time to solve the
problem. A marginally-significant difference in scale was
obtained between level IV and level III (6.66 vs. 3.60),
_t(5)«2.28, p<.10. Problem-solving time did not differ
significantly between level IV and Mi (74 vs. 132 sees,
t^( 13)--1
.55, p> . 10) .
The results for subjects in the Story Analogue-Positive
Transfer Condition who scored at Levels I, 11 and I i I on the
representation scale were combined and compared with the
results for subjects who scored at Level IV. The results are
Illustrated In Table 5 (first two columns). As can be seen
In this table, there Is a highly reliable difference In
proportion of subjects achieving success in these two groups
(100% vs. 38%), X*(1)=9.38, £<.01. More subjects in level IV
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also produced appropriate attempts (100%) than those In
lower levels (50%), xn)=6.62. £<.01. Similarly, subjects
who achieved an abstract schema performed significantly
better than those who d I d not. In terms of the success-
efficiency scale (5.6 vs. 2.8, t(18)=4.7, p<.001). Mean time
to solve the problem (74 vs. 143) also differed reliably
(t(23)—2.36, £<.05).
It Is clear that performance Is different for subjects
who cored at different representational levels. Children who
constructed an abstract schema of the analogous story
problem performed better than those who encoded only
specific or Incomplete or Irrelevant representations.
Remembering complete but specific goal structure Is not
sufficient for analogical transfer.
Effectiveness of Schema Training
Since superior transfer performance was found for
children who constructed an abstract schema, a natural
question Is whether the Instructions given to subjects In
the Schema Training Condition encouraged and helped children
to perceive the underlying principle and to Improve
transfer. Subjects In the Schema Training-Positive Transfer
Condition should display relatively greater facilitation,
whereas subjects In the Schema Training-Negative Transfer
Condition might or might not show more Interference
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depending on whether an abstract schema permits them to
discriminate Its effective application.
The transfer performance of the subjects In both the
Story Analogue-Positive Transfer and Negative Transfer
Conditions and Schema Training Positive Transfer and
Negative Transfer Conditions are Illustrated In Table 3. As
predicted, the proportion of subjects successful In problem
solving In the Schema Training-Positive Transfer Condition
(91%) was reliably higher than the proportion In Story
Analogue-Positive Transfer Condition (60%), xn)=5.5, p< . 05
.
The differences In percentage of subjects Initiating
appropriate attempts (91% vs. 68%) and faulty attempts (0%
vs. 16%) between these two conditions were marginally
s
I
gn I f leant
, £< . 10.
The mean success-efficiency scores (5.1 vs. 3.8
respectively) also differed significantly ( t^( 42 ) =2 . 38 ,
p<.05). In addition, a significant main effect for training
type (Story Analogue vs. Schema Training) was obtained In
the 2X2 ANOVA on this score (F(4 , 88)-4 . 54
,
£<.05). The
Interaction between training type and transfer type was also
marginally significant ( F (4 , 88 )-3 . 43 , £<.10). This
Interaction Indicate that schema training played different
roles for positive and negative transfer. The difference in
mean solving time between the Schema Training Positive
Transfer and the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer Condition
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(86 vs. 118 sees). however, was not significant (t(44)—
1 .45, £> . 10)
.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that subjects
in Schema Training Positive Transfer Condition outperformed
those In the Story Analogue-Positive Transfer Condition. The
superior performance In solving the target problem'
demonstrated the effectiveness of the schema training
method
.
There were no reliable differences for any of the
dependent measures between the schema-trained and untrained
subjects in the Negative Transfer Conditions (see Table 3).
One possibility is that while training Improves positive
transfer performance, It does not affect problem solving
when problem situations Involve different solution rules.
Alternatively, such absence of greater negative effect for
schema-trained groups might be simply the result of the
extremely poor performance of the Negative Transfer groups
(the floor effect).
Another way to address the effects of schema training is
to compare the performance of children who did not form an
abstract representation In the Story Analogue-Positive
Transfer Condition with those who did develop such a schema
only after receiving the training Instructions in the Schema
Training Positive Transfer groups (see Table 5). Seventeen
of 21 children in the Schema Training Positive Transfer
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Condition did not evidence Level iv representation before
being Instructed. It Is Interesting to note that those 4
subjects Who did spontaneously achieve Level iv
representation prior to training performed very similarly to
those 9 who achieved level IV In the Story Analogue Positive
Transfer Condition. The one noticeable difference between
these two level IV groups was problem-solving time (29 vs.
74, t( 18)=2.07, £<. 10)
.
Receiving the Instructions to prompt schema construction
did significantly Improve such representation and transfer.
Eighty-eight percent of subjects In the training condition
who Initially failed to demonstrate level IV representation
but did so after training, successfully solve the target
problem, compared to only 38% of subjects who did not
receive Instructions and did not achieve level IV
(X(1)-9.17, £<.01). The difference in appropriate attempt
between these two groups (88% vs. 50%) was also reliable
(X(1)«5.7, p<.06), as was the difference In the success-
efficiency score (4.9 vs. 2.8, _t ( 27 ) «-3 . 1 6
, £<.01). However,
mean time (99 vs. 143 respectively) did not approach
significance (jt(31 )«1 .69, £>.10).
Additional comparisons were carried examining the
difference In performance between the subjects who
spontaneously constructed level IV representations In the
Story Analogue Positive Transfer Condition and those
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subjects who required training to achieve such a level of
rep resent at 1 on
.
if subjects who spontaneous I y form an
abstract schema perform better than those who required aids
to develop such a schema, It would suggest that a
spontaneously-formed abstract schema is more effective than
a prompted one. However, positive schema-training for those
subjects who did not spontaneously achieve Level IV yielded
a prof 1 le of performance quite siml lar to that of the
subjects who produced the abstract schemas spontaneously.
The results are summarized In Table 6. Although the former
ach I eved slightly higher scores than the latter, the
differences In the various measures were not reliable, it
was appropriate and effective to instruct children by
encouraging and guiding them to discover the underlying
principle In order to improve transfer performance.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Data obtained from subjects' performance on problem
solving enables us 1) to examine the pattern of positive and
negative transfer, 2) to assess whether 6-year-old children
are able to extract an abstract principle as a vehicle to
cross the "gap" between problems which share Identical rules
but different surface formats, 3) to examine the function of
different levels of representation In terms of transfer
value, and 4) to determine whether children who did not
spontaneously construct an abstract schema can be trained to
do so and Improve subsequent analogical transfer.
The results revealed that 6-year-olds are able to
spontaneously transfer analogous solutions and that an
abstract representation of the source analogs Is an
Important factor In analogical transfer. Once children
constructed a relatively abstract representation, the
likelihood of transfer greatly Increased. The data also
showed a negative transfer effect. Prior story problems
could hinder, rather than facilitate, problem solving when
problems Involved different solution principles. Moreover,
schema training effectively Improved transfer performance In
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the positive condition although it did not Improve ability
to discriminate the effectiveness of a solution In the
negative transfer condition.
As noted in the Introduction, "accessing" or "noticing"
and mapping are often theorized as the critical processes
In analogical transfer. Before an analogous problem can be
applied to solve a target problem in another domain, the
source or base analog must first be accessed, and then
correspondences must be mapped from base to target (e.g..
Brown & Camplone. 1981; Holyoak, 1984; Bransford et ai,
1987; Gentner, in press). Several studies of transfer (
e.g., Gick & Hoiyoak, 1980; Reed et al, 1974; Reed, 1987)
have demonstrated that people often fail to spontaneously
access prior analogous Information and therefore fall to map
the underlying structures.
One Important factor which influences analogical
transfer Is the similarity shared by base and target
problems. There is a widespread claim that transfer would
never occur If the problem situations did not share any
commonality (e.g., Thorndike, 1903; McGeoch, 1932; Simon,
1980; Holyoak, 1984; Brown & Camplone, 1984; Gentner, in
press). However, there are two kinds of similarity,
superficial and structural, which play different roles In
accessing and mapping processes. It Is widely accepted that
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superficial similarity, that Is. surface commonality Is very
Important In accessing, and that transfer tends to occur
when problems share certain superficial similarities. This
Is true for both adults and children (e.g.. Holyoak et al.
1984; Centner. 1984. 1987; Stein at el. 1986; Holland et al,
1986; Reed. 1987; Ho
I
yoak & Koh
. 1987). Surface commonality
plays a role by providing a "hint" or "cue". However, once
problems do not Involve the same underlying principle or
structure. such superficial features might Interfere with
solving the target problem. In addition, what should be
transferred Is the principle. rather than the specific
surface features. Therefore, whether superficial similarity
plays a positive or negative role would depend on whether
the base and the target problem Involve the same structure
or rule. Thus, underlying structural similarity will play a
crucial role In mapping, but may also be a significant
element In noticing, as well.
Absence of transfer most frequently occurs when there Is
failure to perceive the underlying common structure. The
results of the present study demonstrated that although
subjects In the positive transfer condition who received two
analogue stories performed better than those who did not,
only the subjects who were able to extract the principle
from two source analogs (I.e., achieve Level IV
representation) could consistently access and apply the
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generalized principle to the target problem. This finding is
consistent with the results of several other studies (e.g..
Gick & Holyoak. 1986). Thus, successful transfer greatly
depends on whether subjects create an abstract
representation of the two source analogs.
An abstract representation has more Impact on successful
solving than the accuracy for specific memory of either the
Irrelevant details or even the key points of the story
problems. The present study directly compared the
effectiveness of an abstract schema and a specific
representation in terms of transfer. The failure of transfer
for subjects characterized as attaining only Level I
representation would suggest that absence of transfer might
be due to the fact that an analogous solution was not
available In memory. In addition, data also showed that
subjects who scored at representation levels II or III did
not differ from those at the baseline level In their
performance. This finding suggests that accurate memory for
key elements Is not sufficient, although it may be
necessary, for transfer to occur. The findings that there
were significant differences In performance of subjects at
levels IV and III, and no reliable difference between those
subjects scoring on level III and those at baseline.
Indicate that remembering more specific key aspects does not
seem critical to transfer. Solutions embedded In specific
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representations are hard to separate from particular
contexts; therefore, transfer performance was not Improved.
Once the representation was relatively doma I n- I ndependent
.
It yielded better transfer.
The results of this study may or may not be consistent
with Brown et al's findings (1986) which suggested that
memory for key points of the story problems ("goal
structure") Is critical for transfer. One poss i b I I i ty Is
that subjects who formed a goal structure also achieved
abstract representations, although their study did not
address this issue. However, the "gap" between base and
target problems was relatively narrow; remembering the i<ey
elements of the base stories was sufficient for transfer to
occur. Once the gap increases, transfer may require a more
abstract schema which Is more "generally accessible" (Brown
& Camp lone, 1982) to a variety of domains. Domain-specific
representations become ineffective because accessibility is
limited to a restricted set of contexts. Thus, transfer
performance depends on whether the subjects' understanding
Is characterized as abstract or simply memory for specific
solutions. Success In accessing, mapping and eventually
applying. Involves a great deal more than simply having
context-dependent Information. Transfer often requires being
able to flexibly, resourcefully and efficiently manipulate
and utilize Information. The level of representation or the
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depth Of processing of the story problems Is an Important
determinant of analogical transfer.
Investigations have found that structural similarity
Plays an Important role In mapping and also influences
accessing to some degree (e.g., Gentner, m press. Holland
et al., 1986). It is not always useful and appropriate to
emphasize the surface attributes shared by problems.
Consider the situation In which one of two source analogs
shares the Identifying principle, but does not share surface
features with the target problem. In another case, the
target shares superficial attributes. but does not share
underlying structure. The process of subjects' spontaneous
selection of source analogs can be directly addressed.
One way to Increase the ease with which such deep level
information Is accessed and mapped. Is to prompt subjects to
generate a relatively abstract representation of the
solution principle. The present study demonstrated that
abstract schemas can be trained effectively. Schema training
In this study encouraged and guided children to focus on the
key points and to compare these two sets of i<ey elements,
that is, to extract the underlying solution principle and
draw attention away from the surface features. Such schema
training improves the flexible use of the base story
problems in the positive transfer condition. Children who
did not spontaneously create an abstract schema but then
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received Instructions helping them to do so. performed much
better than those who did not receive such Instructions.
There was no difference In the performance of subjects who
spontaneously formed the abstract schema and who were
prompted to achieve such a level. This finding provided a
further confirmation that representation level Is a major
factor and main determinant of subjects' capacity to
genera I I ze
.
But once a general principle Is accessed and mapped onto
the new problem, subjects must discriminate whether the
principle Is applicable In the target problem situation.
Difficulty In solving the target problem might be due to
either the absence of transferring an appropriate solution,
I
I
or application of a Inappropriate solution principle. Brown
j
and Camp I one ( 1984) have pointed out that "a major
i
Impediment to flexible learning Is often not the lack of
transfer across domains but rather Inappropriate transfer.
Efficient learning Involves discriminating when, where and
what to transfer rather than blind application of known
Information" (pp.185). Blind application might occur If
subjects fall to evaluate the general principle In the new
problem situation. This seems to have occurred in the
present study. In the negative transfer conditions, a low
proportion of subjects successfully solved the problem, and
a high proportion of subjects made misguided attempts. When
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the problem required a different principle. subjects were
not able to evaluate the appropriateness of the learned rule
In the new problem situation, and to avoid Interference. The
failure to discriminate the problem situations In the
negative transfer conditions led to a decrease In
performance on problem solving compared to the control
group. Difficulty In applying knowledge arises when either
the available Information can not be accessed when needed,
or different problem solutions can not be distinguished.
It is often assumed that to achieve flexible and
appropriate transfer across tasi< boundaries. It is Important
to construct a relatively abstract, doma 1 n- 1 ndependent
structure or deep-level principle. Efficient learning and
understanding also involves acquiring Information about the
conditions under which the abstract principle can be
applied. The Importance of acquiring "cond i t i ona i i zed
knowledge" or the "constraints and conditions" of the use of
available knowledge have been emphasized by several
theorists (e.g., Glaser, 1984; Simon, 1980; Sternberg &
Caruso, 1985; Bransford et al., 1987). Schema training in
the negative transfer condition In the present study focused
on helping children discover the general principle, but did
not emphasize the constraints governing Its use. Thus the
Instructions did not help subjects evaluate whether the
general principle could be applied In the new problem.
64
Further work is needed to explore the conditions and
Instructions which facilitate positive transfer and
simultaneously avoid blind application.
Developmental Implications
Data from the present study revealed that first grade
children are capable of spontaneously producing a relatively
abstract representation from two story problems and of
transferring the analogous solutions to solve a target
problem. Although this study did not directly assess
developmental differences, the findings do have some
Implications for explanations of developmental differences
In analogical transfer.
Several psychologists (e.g., Gelman, 1978; Rozin, 1976;
Fodor, 1972) have argued that the older child tends to be
able to transfer his or her knowledge across a variety of
domains, while the young child needs to be tested with a
particular set of stimuli. In a particular setting, with a
particular task. They also argue that with age cognitive
structures which initially serve In a restricted way can be
accessed and applied to a wider and wider range of tasks.
Several investigations have shown that older children
are more likely to use analogous solutions to solve a
problem (e.g., Holyoak, et a I., 1984; Crisafi & Brown,
1986). Although the popular claim concerning young children
Is that they tend to acquire knowledge In a way that Is
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Closely tied, or restricted to occasions of learning (Brown
& Camplone. 1984; Brown. In press). evidence has been
provided that children as young as three years are capable
of solving analogical problems If the tasks and the distance
between base and target problem are age-appropriate. A
transfer task can be viewed as a problem In discovering how
previously acquired Information can be applied to a novel
situation. Most developmental studies can not be directly
compared because of the different transfer tasks that have
been employed. However, pieces of findings have significant
Implications for the picture that emerges concerning the
development of analogical transfer.
It Is a widespread belief that younger children are less
likely to transfer because they tend to rely on superficial
similarity among problems. Such surface commonality Includes
(1) physical or perceptual features of objects In problems;
(2) semantic domains or themes reflected by the characters
and their activities; and (3) the modality In which base and
target problems are presented. What young children learn
might tend to be restricted to the domain or context In
which It was originally learned, and transfer of such
knowledge would depend on whether the new problem Involves
superficial cues. Such knowledge might gradually become free
from the specific context with age.
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There is evidence In the deve i opmenta I literature
Showing a tendency for children at different ages to be
Influenced by surface s im
1
I ar I ty of prob I ems . Cr 1 saf I and
Brown's series of experiments (1986) have shown no transfer
in 2-year-olds. some transfer In 3-year-oIds if two problem
versions shared physical similarities, and transfer in four-
year-olds even when the problems were perceptually
dissimilar. The failure of 3-year-olds can be Interpreted to
suggest that younger children are more perceptually-bound
than older children. However. the superior performance of
the 4-year-olds does not necessarily mean that children at
this age level are capable of extracting an abstract rule
from different problems. The gap or distance between base
and target problems In the CrIsafI and Brown study can be
seen as very narrow because they shared some surface
commonalities such as the context cues. All the problem
situations Involved Inserting a coin to earn a gumba I I or
candy. Four-year-olds may view these different versions of a
problem as the same theme since they involve the same type
of activity. Other developmental studies have demonstrated
the Importance of superficial similarity In children's
analogical learning (e.g., Holyoal< et al.. 1984; Deloache,
1985). For example. Gentner and Toupin (1986) suggest that
younger children (5-7 years old) rely on surface features
rather than relations, but that by 8-10 years old, children
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begin to possess the capac i ty to perceive and utilize the
underlying structure or " h
I gher-order-re I at I ons"
.
So far, it can be seen that although young children are
able to transfer analogous problem solutions to solve a
target problem, their ability to perform analogical transfer
Is fragile. Young children's analogical transfer can occur
only under optimal conditions In which source analogs and
target problem share some surface commonality, or where
explicit hints are provided to Inform them that the
information Is relevant to the problem they confront.
The transfer task In the present study required children
to remember story problems, and more Importantly, to extract
and generalize an abstract principle from the problems In
order to flexibly apply this Information. Young children's
difficulty In analogical transfer might be due largely to
their deficiency In deep processes of understanding.
Younger children, given the present transfer task, might
rely more on the superficial Information and have more
difficulty In selecting the key elements and connecting them
Into a coherent organization, and as a consequence might be
less likely to show transfer. This task was assumed to be
suitably difficult and challenging for 6-year-old children.
Although target problems did not involve surface cues such
as similar objects, semantic domain or context, many
children at this age were capable of spontaneously
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constructing an underlying structure of the two story
prob I ems
.
It has been traditionally thought that summarizing and
abstracting requires an awareness of text or story structure
and that this kind of analysis Is beyond the skill of young
children. Deep processing Involves selecting the critical
constituents while deemphas I z I ng the extraneous Information,
and condensing those units Into an coherent structure or
schema (Van DIJk & Kintsch, 1983; Hayes & Simon. 1976;
Greeno, 1977; Johnson. 1978; Mandler. 1983). In the present
study, an ability to extract and generalize the underlying
principle from different specific story problems was evident
In first graders at least In a rudimentary form. The learned
principle can be used to guide problem solving In different
contexts, rather than remain tied to the particular context
In which It was learned.
What Is responsible for the greater efficiency of older
children In analogical learning? Two popular alternative
explanations offered for why younger children are less
likely to transfer their knowledge to a broad range of tasks
are lack of specific knowledge and differences In mental
capacity (Brown, In press; Gentner & Toupln. 1986). Data
from the present study Indicated that children's capacity to
generalize and abstract Is responsible for transfer
performance. Although specific problem solutions were
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available In memory, they were not flexibly used because of
I ack of genera I I ty
.
The major mediating factor for developmental Improvement
In transfer might be the growth of capacity to generalize
and abstract. which Influences how deeply children can
process and understand the analogs and target problems, and
at what level they perceive the relationship between them.
The level at which children can process materials or
problems and construct a representation of problems would
determine the accessibility and applicability of the
representation. It seems appropriate to explain children's
frequent failure to transfer Information. as being the
result of difficulty In processing and understanding
problems at a deeper level. It Is because of the lack of
capacity to generalize and abstract that young children's
ability to perceive structure commonality or the principle
underlying certain specific domains or contexts Is fragile.
Since younger children have been assumed to be more
perceptually-bound, and to lack the ability to perceive
deep-level structures, negative transfer such as functional
fixedness, cognitive embeddedness and negative learning set
(Brown, In press) would be more likely to occur when
problems share similar surface format but not underlying
structure. In this case, although children are able to
transfer. It Is not appropriate, and therefore prior
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knowledge impedes rather than enhances flexible use of the
knowledge acquired. Brown and Kane (In press) have found
that Information gained from a pretralning phase where a
certain function of an object was emphasized, or a
particular rule learned, had an Impact on young children's
target problem solving when it required an alternative
solution. Results from the present study indicated that
negative transfer occurs even when base and target problems
share few surface features. This study also demonstrated the
lack of ability of children to discriminate conditions under
which the learned principle can be suitably applied. Such
blind application interferes with selecting alternative
poss 1 b 1 1 1 1 1 es
.
Further studies need to be designed to examine age
differences In both positive and negative transfer. On the
one hand, children's ability to flexibly transfer knowledge
Increases with the Improvement of capacity to abstract and
generalize. Younger children tend to restrict what they
learn to a narrow set of contexts, while older children are
able to process and understand materials more deeply and
transfer the information to a broad set of tasks. On the
other hand, negative transfer might decrease with age
because older children tend to be able to build knowledge
structures Including information about the conditions and
constraints of Its use. Older children might be less
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perceptually-bound. therefore, able to avoid the
Interferences of surface features, and more capable of
evaluating the appropriateness and seeking other potential
solutions In a new problem situation.
Implications for Education
Much research on transfer In problem solving In recent
years has shown that people do not often spontaneously
transfer prior Information from one situation to another.
One popular method used to Improve adults and children's
transfer has been to provide certain kinds of hints or to
directly Inform subjects that the problems are Isomorphic.
Research has shown that providing hints to subjects
dramatically Increases transfer (e.g., GIck & Ho I yoak , 1980
1983; Holyoak et al, 1983; CrIsafI & Brown, 1986; Welsberg
et al, 1978; Perfetto et al, 1983; Stein et al, 1986). This
fact provides supportive evidence for the claim that
"noticing" and "mapping" are critical or major aspects of
using analogies, particularly In those cases in which the
"gap" between noticing and applying Is narrow. In such
cases, once the Insight has been achieved, the problem is
basically solved, and hints often help to gain such Insight.
When hints are provided. It can not be firmly concluded that
children at a certain age are able to flexibly use
analogies, since discovery of a hidden analogy Is often the
key to finding a suitable solution to a problem.
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Although explicit hints Increase the likelihood of
transferring Information from one domain to another, such
aids do not always seem appropriate. In applied and
practical problem situations. It Is not often the case that
a teacher can directly Inform students what knowledge Is
suitable or Inappropriate to the novel problem situation.
Knowledge use outside of school or within classrooms (e.g.,
Royer, 1979) requires students to flexibly and appropriately
apply Information Independently. The problems that are
encountered often give little suggestion as to what
knowledge may be relevant to solving the problems. Thus,
whether students are able to notice the link between prior
problems and the solutions and the current problem will
depend greatly on how deeply they process and understand the
prob I ems
.
One major reason for failure to discover the Isomorphic
link between problems Is that prior problems are understood
In a specific fashion and such Information Is welded to a
particular context. The danger of "Inert knowledge" has been
widely recognized (Whitehead, 1929; Bransford et al, 1987).
Such Inert knowledge can not be accessed and applied to a
variety of domains where It Is potentially applicable. One
major purpose of education is to help students build basic
knowledge which can be widely used, rather than Inert facts,
and to develop students' ability to flexibly transfer the
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knowledge acquired. Results from the present study suggest
that one limitation to transfer is the failure to process
information at a sufficiently abstract level. Abstract
representation can be accessed more flexibly when an
isomorphic problem Is encountered. while specific
Information In prior problems often remains Inert and
passive, although still accurate. "Bare facts In memory do
not solve problems" (Simon, 1978).
Brown (in press) has discussed various methods of
enhancing young children's analogical transfer. Aids include
hints, Instructions, such as explicitly Informing subjects
that two base problems are the same, prompting children to
discuss the similarities between problems, and encouraging
children to teach the specific solution to others enhance
subsequent transfer. Abstract schema training In the present
study provided evidence that a method which encourages and
guides students to process materials more deeply, to
discover the underlying structure, and to construct an
abstract schema. Is effective In prompting broader transfer.
Instructions stating the essential rule (Brown & Campione,
1984) appear to be more appropriate and valuable In terms of
transfer than Instructions which emphasize bare facts and
deta Ms.
In the present study, the performance of subjects who
spontaneously formed abstract schemas and the performance of
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subjects who were prompted to do so, did not differ
significantly. This finding bears upon Issues concerned with
discovery versus expository methods of teaching and
learning. In ru I e- I nduct I on experiments, discovery learning
has often been found to facilitate transfer more than
expository learning (e.g., Katona, 1940; Guthrie, 1967).
While discovery methods require students to process
materials deeply and search for generalizations, expository
methods may reinforce only specific facts (see Andre, 1986).
The real Issue then, may not be discovery or expository
learning, but rather the cognitive activities students use
during the processes of understanding (Andre, 1979; 1986).
The instructions in the schema training conditions in the
present study focused on understanding the underlying
structure and generalizing the solution principle from the
source analogs. Such schema training was effective In
facilitating analogical transfer.
Although the failure to spontaneously transfer
Information In problem solving has been consistently
reported In the research literature, scientists and
Inventors In various domains often do use relevant
Information without explicit prompts (e.g., Okagak I &
OkagakI, 1987; Gordon, 1979; Knorr. 1980). One explanation
Is that they possess more effective and higher levels of
knowledge structure In term of abstractness and
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applicability. Thus, while solving problems, experts tend to
be able to process the materials more deeply and perceive
the deep structure whereas novices attend to the surface
characteristics of the problem situations (e.g.. Ch I et ai..
1981; Chi et al.. 1982; Larkin et ai.. 1980; Larkln. 1980).
Much of traditional and recent research has also shown
the positive effects of a variety of examples on subsequent
transfer In problem solving (e.g.. Grether &Wolfie. 1936;
Adams. 1954; Morrlsett & Hovland. 1959; GIck & Ho I yoak
.
1983; Gholson. 1987). Here, too, a major reason for the
superior transfer performance may be that the multiple
source analogs provide opportunities for subjects to extract
the common underlying principle and to realize that the same
abstract principle can be used In problems with different
surface formats. A principle extracted from problems with
similar superficial features might tend to be tied to
problems with the same format. Only principles extracted and
generalized from problems with different superficial
characteristics can be highly accessible and effective In
terms of applicability.
Further Studies on Children's Analogical Transfer
Two kinds of similarity, surface and structural, have
been theorized to play an Important role In accessing and
mapping processes. Additional studies need to be conducted
to explore the ways In which surface features and structural
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s Iml lar I ty of story problems influence ch I I dren
' s act I ve
search and selecting processes. Questions such as how
semantic domain and modality of problems Influence level of
representation In term of abstraction and subsequent
transfer also need to be addressed.
Surface similarity Includes several aspects. Three
primary features are 1) major character; 2) goal object, and
3) theme (story context). These superficial features might
play different roles as activation cues In accessing the
base story problems. In order to evaluate the Influence of
various aspects of surface and structural similarity, and
explore the processes of searching and selecting an
analogue, experiments may need to be Included In which a set
of base story problems In the experimental condition bear a
specific relationship to the target problem, and every
subject Is exposed to all the stories. For example. In one
planned experiment, three base problems share some surface
feature with the target problem, such as major character,
goal object, or theme, respectively. Another base problem
does not share surface features, but only the solution
principle Is Isomorphic. Each of these four story problems
provides a solution principle (e.g., "raise water level",
"combine lengths", "pierce object", or "use sticky
substance") for the target problem which requires subjects
to get a bead out of a cylinder. A fifth base problem shares
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no similarity with the target problem. Subjects's problem
solving behavior after receiving these base story problems
will allow us to examine the effects of superficial
similarities on pos I t I ve transfer.
In another experiment. the superficial feature of the
target problem and each of the five base problems will be
the same as those In the first experiment, but only the
Isomorphic problem shares the same solution principle with
the target and will work for the target. The effects of
superficial features on negat 1 ve transfer can be explored In
this exper I ment
.
Children at different ages will be Included. In these
experiments, we can begin to understand how surface features
Influence the choice of an Isomorphic solution In positive
and negative conditions at different age levels.
The effects of similarity In the semantic domains of
base problems, and between base and target problems and how
modality of problems Influences representation level and
transfer are also of Interest. For example, experiments need
to be carried out to compare performance by subjects who
receive two base problems (A' and A") from the same domain
as the target problem (A) with subjects who will be
presented two base problems from a similar domain (B' and
B") but that differs from the transfer problem (A) and
subjects who will be presented base problems from two
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different domains (B and C) that also differ from the target
domain (A). a key goal In this experiment Is to determine
how similarity m semantic domain affects noticing and
representing the solution principle and how this affects
transfer In children at different ages.
Effects of modal Ity of problems could be examined In
other experiments. In prior studies on analogical transfer,
base and target problems have Involved the same modality.
For example. with adults. base and target tasks have
typically been story problems (e.g.. GIck & Holyoak. 1980;
1983) and with children. story problems In which physical
props have been added to demonstrate the solution to the
problems (Brown et ai., 1986; Holyoak et al., 1984). or
physical problems only, with the same theme (e.g., "Candy
game" In Crisafi & Brown, 1986). Such modality Identity
might provide "context cues" which may greatly influence
children's analogical transfer.
The major Issue addressed is the relation of transfer
performance to base and target problem modality
presentation. The effects of different modalities such as
practical, pictorial and verbal problems, could be
Investigated. In some conditions, the modality would be the
same for the base and target problems, but In others, they
could differ. It is predicted that transfer performance
should be higher when the modalities are the same, and
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younger children might benefit more f rom moda I I ty Identity
than older children do.
Transfer performance Is greatly determined by whether
subjects construct a schema with the key elements at an
abstract level. Transfer performance also depends on the
structural features of the story problems. Problem
components such as goal, obstacle, solution and the causal
relationship between these and the problem solution
constitute the coherent structure or complete structure of a
problem. An Incomplete structure exists when the goal and
obstacle are deemphas I zed and the casual relationship among
these key elements Is violated.
Experiments could also be conducted to examine the
effects of complete versus Incomplete structure on
children's analogical transfer. Children might have
considerably difficulty In using the solution principle from
an Incomplete-structure base story compared to a complete-
structure story. If structural similarity Is an Important
component In analogical transfer. Age differences will also
be explored.
The effects of superficial features and structural
similarity on children's searching and selecting an
analogous solution and developmental differences In
analogical transfer can be systematically explored In these
stud I es
.
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APPENDIX A
BASE STORIES
Story Set 1: "Adding" Solutions
Story 1: The Thirsty Bird
Once upon a time there was a bird who lived on a forest.
She was pretty and smart. Some of her friends often told her
about the people, buildings and other things In the city.
One day. In the summer, she decided to go to the city. She
got up before sun-rise and flew for several hours, miles and
miles, because the city was far away. It was very hot. She
become very thirsty but could not find anything to drink.
Finally, she landed In a field and found a bottle half full
of water. She put her beak Into the bottle and stretched her
neck, but the water was too low In the bottle for her to
reach It. After thinking a bit, she came up with a good
Idea: She picked up a pebble In her beak and dropped It In
the bottle. Then she picked up another and another... She
continued to put pebbles Into the bottle, one by one, and
each time a pebble fell In the bottle, the water got a
little bit higher, until finally she cou I d reach the water
with her beak and got a long, cool drink. Refreshed after
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drinking the water, she sang and flapped her wings, and flew
on to see the city.
Story 2: The Fallen Ball
Eddie was In second grade. He liked to swim, play
baseball and ping-pong, and go fishing with his grandfather.
Eddie was very good at these things. One day, during a
summer vacation, he was playing a game of ping-pong in the
back-yard of his house. Eddie and his friends had a
wonderful time playing together. Suddenly, the ball bounced
across the lawn and roiled Into a small but deep hole. The
hole was too deep for the boys to reach the ball with their
hands. They had to think of a different way to get the ball
out. After a few minutes of thinking, Eddie came up with a
great Idea: He went to the house, brought out a long hose.
He connected the hose to a water tap and filled the hole
with water from the hose. The boys were very happy because
the ping-pong ball floated to the top. After getting the
ball, they went on playing the game.
Story Set 2: "Combining" Solutions
Story 1 : The Hungry Monkey
Once upon a time, there was a monkey who lived In a
beautiful forest with his friends. He was very smart and
worked hard. He and his friends had a little house and
planted many flowers around their home. Every day, they
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walked several miles looking for food. One day. he and his
two friends were caught by some hunters and were sent to the
zoo. From then on. he had to live In a big cage. He was
always very hungry In the zoo. He often tried to get food
outside of his cage or from other cages. One day. people put
some bananas outside the cage, but they were too far away
for him to reach. He looked around and saw two poles lying
right outside his cage. He picked up one of the poles and
tried to reach the banana with It. However, the po i e was too
short. He was very hungry Indeed. After thinking a bit. he
came up with a good Idea: He grabbed both poles and stuck
two together by putting one inside the other to make a po i
e
long enough to reach the banana. He finally got the food and
was very proud.
Story 2: The Caught Ball
Eddie was In second grade. He liked to swim, play
baseball and ping-pong, and go fishing with his grandfather.
Eddie was good at these things. One day, during a summer
vacation, he was playing baseball In the back-yard of his
house. Eddie and his friends had much fun together. Now it
was time for Eddie to bat. When the ball was pitched, Eddie
hit It. Up, up. went the ba I I to the top of the roof of the
house, and It got stuck In a corner. The boys could not
reach the ball and could not find a ladder to climb on top
of the roof either. They had to think of a different way to
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get the ball down. They thought and thought. Finally, Eddie
came up with a great Idea. He combined two bats together
with a thick string so that the bats were long enough to
reach the ball. The boys were happy. After getting the ball,
they went on playing their game.
Control Stories: Irrelevant to solution
Story 1 : The New House
Nancy was moving into a new house. It was white, with
red porches. It was much bigger than her old house. She was
going to have her very own room. Before, she had to share
with her big sister. On moving day, the movers carried the
beds and chairs and rugs out the old house and Into the
truck. When everything was In the truck, they closed It up,
and drove to the new house. Nancy and her fami iy got into
their car and also drove to the new house. As soon as the
door was unlocked, Nancy ran into the new rooms. She found
the kitchen, and the bathroom, but she didn't stop until she
found her very own bedroom. There she sat, waiting for the
movers to bring her things. "I will put them where I want,"
she thought. "My sister can't tell me what to do In my very
own room." Nancy was sure to be happy In this new house.
Story 2: The Zoo Visit
Jennifer and her grandparents were going to the zoo.
They parked In the big parking lot, and then rode In a fancy
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trolley to the gate. They bought tickets and gave them to
the gatekeeper. Now they were Inside. "Where do you want to
go first?", asked Grandma and Grandpa. Jennifer told them
that she always liked to go to the elephants first because
they were closest. They watched the elephants and then there
was a big noise from the seals, so they went over there, and
watched the keeper throw them fish. Watching the seals eat
made them hungry, so Grandma and Grandpa and Jennifer ate
lunch, too. Then they looked at the monkeys and hippo and
the giraffe, and so many other animals that they all got too
tired to walk anymore. They rode the trolley back to their
car. On the way home Jennifer fell asleep, and dreamed of a
fun new animal - A mix of a giraffe and a bear!
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APPENDIX B
Examples of Four Levels of Representation
Level I. Irrelevant Recall:
(1) Recall: "A monkey.
. .once he lived In the forest. He
found some food... The zoo keeper caught him In the forest.
He got put in the zoo, and he always hungry." (subject #48)
(2) Comparison: ( Exper Imenter : "Do you think the two
stor les are ai Ike?")
.
"No. Wei I the boy was not an animal ..
.
(subject #8)
(3) Comparison: "They were alike because some of them
are kind of funny. Maybe one of them Is a make believe story
and one of them is a real story." (subject #79)
Level li. Incomplete Recall:
(1) Recall: "That he lived In the forest with his
friends. He planted many flowers... Some hunters came and
then caught him and brought him to the zoo... He put two
poles together and got the banana" (subject #23)
(2) Comparison: (similar to that in level 1)
Level III. Complete Specific Recall:
(1) Recall: "...He was very hungry but the banana was
too far away. He could not reach the banana. He got two
short poles. He found an idea. He put two poles together to
86
reach the banana." (subject #101)
(2) Comparison: (similar to that In level I or II)
Level IV. Abstract Representation:
(1) Recal I : (siml lar to that In level III)
(2) Comparison: "Yes... In the monkey story, the monkey
put two poles together, and the other story, the boys were
playing baseball, They put two bats together, and It was
longer, to get the bail down... the two stories are alike."
( sub Ject #17)
(3) "Yes, because both of them could not reach
someth I ng
. . . They thought for a few minutes. They both put
two things together to reach something... and got what they
were looking for." (subject #64)
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